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Abstract
In this paper I employ a dynamic general equilibrium model to study macroe-
conomic effects and welfare implications of alternative reforms to the U.S. health
insurance system. In particular, I focus on expanding Medicare to the entire
population, extending Medicaid, and having an individual mandate as well as
other related medical reforms. All these reforms can be financed in several ways.
I consider a stochastic OLG framework with heterogeneous agents facing uncer-
tain health shocks. Individuals make optimal decisions on labor supply, health
insurance, and medical services. As the amount of optimal medical consumption
and hours worked are endogenous, this environment captures general equilibrium
effects. The model is calibrated to the U.S. data. Numerical simulations indicate
that reforming the health insurance system has several important macroeconomic
effects on health expenditures, hours worked, and welfare.
JEL codes: E21, E62, I10
Keywords: Health care reform, Heterogeneous agents model, Welfare analysis
∗I am very grateful to Adrian Peralta-Alva and Manuel Santos for their advice and en-
couragement. I also thank Luca Bossi, Pedro Gomis-Porqueras, Juergen Jung, David Kelly,
Luis Locay, Jianjun Miao, Oscar Mitnik, and seminar participants at the 14th International
Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance, 2009 Midwest Macro Meeting, CUNY
Queens College, FAU, FIU, Tilburg University, University of Miami, for helpful comments
and insightful discussions. All remaining errors are mine. Email: z.feng2@gmail.com. Web:
http://z.feng2.googlepages.com.
1 Introduction
National health expenditures accounted for 16.3% of the U.S. GDP in 2007, compared to 5.2%
in 1960 (Department of Health & Human Services, 2006). The rapid growth of medical costs
leaves a large fraction of the population without health insurance.1 The lack of insurance has
serious negative consequences that include lack of access to needed care, declining health, and
the possibility of crushing financial burdens. Uninsured adults are far more likely to postpone
accessing health care or to forgo it altogether and are less able to afford prescription drugs or
follow through with recommended treatments. A report by the Institute of Medicine (2003)
states that the uninsured have a more rapid decrease in general health and a higher risk of
dying prematurely than the insured. According to their estimation the cost for diminished
health and shorter life span due to lack of insurance was between $65 and $130 billion in
2003. There are also financial externalities imposed by the uninsured on the third party
through uncompensated care, whose costs were estimated to be $57.4 billion in 2008 [Hadley
et al. (2008)].
These facts have stirred up various proposals for changing the U.S. health care system
and to cover the uninsured. There are many empirical studies that explore the impacts of
health care reforms on individual’s behavior such as crowding-out by public insurance [e.g.
see Culter and Gruber (1996), Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004), Gruber and Simon(2008)],
medical usage [Cheng and Chiang (1997)], and health status [Lurie et al. (1984), Currie and
Gruber (1996), Hanratty (1996), Decker and Remler (2005)]. However, there is a paucity of
economic models that address the macroeconomic and welfare implications of reforming the
U.S. health care system.
A reform of the health insurance system could potentially affect macroeconomic variables
by distorting the labor market through changes in tax rates, reducing the number of unin-
sured, and raising the aggregate health expenditure. Reforming the health insurance system
will affect the household’s demand for health insurance. Some individuals may shift from
existing private insurance coverage to either the newly subsidized form of private coverage
or to public coverage. This in turn alters the pool of agents insured, which affects insurance
premiums. Similarly, different insurance decisions result in changing health status and labor
productivity, which then will affect wages and hours worked. A change in the labor income
117% of the nonelderly in the US was uninsured in 2007 according to Kaiser (2008).
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tax may be required to fund the reform, which consequently will influence individual’s labor
supply decisions. A reform will also change agents’ saving behavior (and thus the aggre-
gate capital stock and factor prices) because health insurance may reduce precautionary
saving motives. At the same time, better health implies longer life expectancy and thus a
higher saving incentive. These complicated tradeoffs can only be fully captured in a general
equilibrium framework.
The aim of this study is to analyze the macroeconomic impacts and welfare implica-
tions of alternative reforms to the health insurance system in the U.S. I depart from the
existing literature by adding endogenous health expenditure and labor-leisure choice, which
will capture some important welfare tradeoffs. I consider the following reform proposals:
(i) the expansion of Medicare to the entire population; (ii) the expansion of Medicaid; (iii)
an individual mandate; (iv) the removal of the subsidy to purchase the employer-sponsored
insurance and to provide a refundable tax credit for insurance purchases. These reforms are
building blocks for current proposals for reform. I calibrate my model to the U.S. data. Then,
I conduct several policy experiments to shed light on the costs and benefits of changing the
health insurance system. Alternative sources of revenue to fund these reforms are also con-
sidered. My numerical experiments suggest that general equilibrium effects are substantial,
and the impact of various reforms on the social welfare can be quite sizable.
My research is closely related to a number of papers. My model is built upon the classic
works of Bewley (1986), Imrohoroglu (1992), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), which
provide a useful framework to study the economy with heterogenous agents and incomplete
market. Several papers introduce exogenous health expenditure shocks into Bewley-type
models. For example, Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi et al. (2006) incorporate heterogeneity
in medical expenses in order to understand the pattern of savings among the elderly. Jeske
and Kitao (2009) study the welfare costs of a tax policy change associated with health
insurance. Different from these papers, here I consider household’ optimal consumption
of medical service following the health capital literature in the spirit of Grossman (1972).
Recent examples include Hall and Jones (2007), Suen (2006) that explain the rapid growth in
health expenditure. Jung and Tran (2008) analyze the effect of the Health Saving Accounts
on the health expenditure and individual’s insurance decision. All these papers use an
inelastic labor supply. In my model, agents make the labor-leisure choice and the government
adjusts tax rates to fund the reforms, which creates distortions in the labor supply. My study
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is thus related to the literature on taxation and labor supply (Prescott (2004), Rogerson
(2007)).
I build on this literature in two ways. First and foremost, the focus of my paper is to
develop a macroeconomic framework to quantify effects of alternative health care reforms.
The existing literature generally focuses on one specific health related policy. I explicitly
model public health insurance so that my model can evaluate a broad set of health care
reforms. Second, my model takes into account general equilibrium effects regarding the
demand and supply of labor and the consumption of medical services. As I show later, in-
troducing labor-leisure choice provide new insights for understanding the welfare implication
of health care reforms. Numerical simulations suggest that the effect of reforms on labor
supply is non-negligible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the OLG model, while section
3 is devoted to the calibration of the utility and production functions with emphasis on
some parameters related to health. Section 4 details some reform proposals and presents all
numerical results. The last section concludes.
2 The benchmark model
2.1 Demographics
This economy has overlapping generations of agents who live a maximum of three periods
as young, middle-aged, and old. Let g ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the age. In the first period, the
measure of newly born agents is normalized to 1. Individuals alive in period t survive to
the next period with a certain probability. For old people this probability is always 0. For
young and middle-aged people, the survival probability is given by ρ(hg), which depends
on the health status hg at the end of age g as described below. The population of young
individuals grows at a constant rate n, implying that the population of young in period t is
(1 + n)t. I denote the relative size of age g to the population as µg, which is determined in
the equilibrium.
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2.2 Agent types
All individuals enter the economy with the same level of health h¯0, an idiosyncratic endow-
ment e0, and an idiosyncratic health risk types ih. Health risk type determines the probability
of drawing a certain health shock εt ∈ Ωε = {ε1, ..., εNε}. The probability distribution of the
shock is assumed to be age-type-dependent. Specifically, the probability of drawing ε ∈ Ωε
by type ih agent at age g is denoted by pg,ih(ε), with Σε∈Ωεpg,ih(ε) = 1 for all (g, ih). A
typical history of shocks up to time t is denoted by σt ≡ {ε0, ..., εt}, with σt+1 = {σt, εt+1}.
Agents are endowed with a fixed amount of time per period that can be allocated to leisure
or labor. Agents participate in the labor market during the first two periods and receive
a wage income w˜eζhl. Here ζ measures the effect of health on labor productivity.2 Health
is an important form of human capital. It can enhance workers’ productivity by increasing
their physical capacities, such as strength and endurance, as well as their mental capacities.
I postulate a positive relationship between health and labor productivity.
During their work stage agents receive income in the form of wages and profit Πt from
the firm. They can also save ag units of the consumption good using a storage technology
with gross rate of return Rt+1 = 1+ r. Retired agents have income through previous saving
and profit, and consume all of their income at their last period of life.
The type of an agent is a triple (g, ih, x), where g ∈ {1, 2, 3} is age; ih ∈ {healthy, unhealthy}
is health risk type; and x ∈ R+ is their disposable resources at the beginning of each period
which is defined as follows:
x =

e0, if g = 1
(1 + r)a1, if g = 2
(1 + r)a2 if g = 3
(1)
2.3 Preferences
Preferences over stochastic sequences of consumption, leisure and health are given by
U = Et
{
3∑
g=1
βg−1Πρ(hg−1) · u(cg, Lg, hg)
}
(2)
2See Bloom and Canning (2005). They model the human capital of the worker by v = eφss+φhh, where s
represents years of schooling and h represents health. Here I normalize the effect of schooling.
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where β denotes the discount factor, ρ survival probability, c consumption, L leisure and
h health status. Et denotes the conditional expectation with the information available when
the agent is born.
2.4 The evolution of health
I use the idea of health capital introduced by Grossman (1972). In the model, each agent
chooses an optimal amount of medical consumption m to offset the negative effect of health
shock ε on health and builds up health capital h. The accumulation process of health is
given by:
h′ = (1− δh)h+ ε
exp [Ammζ ]
. (3)
where δh represents the natural deprecation rate of health and Am measures the medical
technology. I assume that technological progress in the production of medical service Am is
exogenously given. The price of medical care pm is exogenously given so that each unit of
consumption good can be transformed into 1
pm
units of medical care.
In previous literature that explores the macroeconomic effects of health related policies
[e.g. Jeske and Kitao (2009)], the health expenditure is treated as an exogenous random
shock. Each period in time individuals must pay the full amount for necessary health care
after the health expenditure shock is revealed, independent of their income level and current
health stock. I, instead, endogenize medical expenditures. Hence, agents can choose an
optimal amount of medical service to build up health stock. Since health expenditure is an
endogenous choice, richer agents will spend more on health care to build up better health
stock than the poor who has the same health status and faces the same health shocks. This
can be explained by the fact that rich individuals have higher levels of consumption and
lower marginal utility from consumption goods, therefore they will substitute some health
for consumption goods.3
Conditional on being alive at the current age with end of period health stock h, agent will
3Wobus, Diana Z. and Gary Olin (2005) found that the average health expenditure decreases with income
level. This can be reconciled by the following fact. The low income has lower health insurance coverage
rate. For people age under 65, the uninsurance rate among person in families with income less than 200%
of poverty line is 24.5%, while the number is only 8.7% among person in middle and high income families.
The price of medical services is much higher for uninsured due to the cost shifting (see Anderson (2007)),
which implies the medical services utilized by low income families can be less than those used by the rich
counterpart.
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survive to the next period with probability ρ(h). Death is certain when health falls below
zero (ρ(h) = 0 if h ≤ 0). I assume that ρ′(h) > 0. Deceased agents leave their savings a as
an accidental bequest that is collected by the government as revenues.
2.5 Medical expenses and health insurance
Non-elderly can choose one out of three possible insurance states labeled as in = {1, 2, 3}.
To purchase private health insurance is in = 1, in = 2 denotes that the agent has Medicaid,
and in = 3 indicates that the agent is uninsured. The out of pocket health expenditure
will be (1 − q˜(pmm, 1))pmm if the agent chooses to buy insurance and (1 − q˜(pmm, 2))pmm
when he/she is covered by the government program. It will cost the entire expenditure
pmm if the agent does not have insurance(q˜(pmm, 3) = 0). Here q˜(pmm, in) is function that
represents the coinsurance rate and varies with the health insurance state in as we discuss
in the following subsection. Agents take coinsurance rate as given and it is calibrated from
the data. Retired agents are insured under Medicare.
2.5.1 Private health insurance
To simplify the analysis, I only consider the Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance (EHI).4
Even when an employer offers health insurance, not all workers get coverage. Some choose
not to enroll, perhaps because they are young or very healthy and feel that health insurance
is not a pressing need, and others’ incomes are so low that they cannot afford insurance.
These tradeoffs will be presented in the benchmark simulation.
Once an agent chooses to purchase EHI a constant premium piE must be paid to the
insurance company, and a fraction qE(pmm) of the total medical expenditure will be paid
by the health insurance company. The premium is not dependent on prior health history or
any individual states. This accounts for the practice that group health insurance does not
price-discriminate the insured by such individual characteristics.
2.5.2 Public health insurance
The government provides two type of health insurances, Medicaid and Medicare, to the
population.
4In the data, more than 90% non-elderly who have private insurance purchase through their employers.
6
Medicaid Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides health insurance coverage
to four main categories of non-elderly low-income individuals (typically below 134 percent
of the federal poverty level, which is $13, 100 for individual in 2007): children, their parents,
pregnant women, and individuals with disabilities. Individuals who do not fall into one of
these groups may be ineligible for Medicaid regardless of their income. Although Medicaid
covers 45 percent of those below the poverty level, the categorical requirement leaves 35
percent of low-income individuals without insurance coverage. I assume that young and
middle-aged individuals are eligible to receive Medicaid if their current income is lower than
the poverty line Yma. There is also an exogenous probability χ of getting a Medicaid offer.
This captures the categorical requirement of Medicaid. The program will cover the fraction
qma(pmm) of the total medical expenditure. Medicaid is a part of government spending.
Medicare I assume that all retirees are enrolled in the Medicare program. Each retiree
pays a fixed premium pimr for Medicare and the program will cover the fraction qmr(pmm)
of the total medical expenditures. Medicare is funded by government revenues.
2.6 The representative agent’s problem
A representative agent of generation g = {1, 2} enters each period with characteristics
sg = (ih, x, hg−1, ima), where ih is the risk type of the agent, x is the net wealth, hg−1 is
the health status at the beginning of the period, and ima is the indicator function that sig-
nals the availability of the Medicaid benefit in the current period. Since all old agents are
automatically enrolled in the Medicare program and leave the labor market, their character-
istics simply are s3 = (ih,x, h2). The distribution of households over their state space is given
by fg(sg, σt), which is endogenously determined in the equilibrium and evolves over time.
Agents observe sg at the beginning of the period. They take prices and taxes as given
and make the insurance decision ing(sg) and choose a set of state-contingent decision rules,
which can be denoted by {cg(sg, εg), ag(sg, εg),mg(sg, εg), Lg(sg, εg)}, to solve the following
problem.
max
t
Et
{
3∑
g=1
βg−1Πρ(hg−1) · u [cg(sg, εg), Lg(sg, εg), hg(sg, εg)] | σt
}
(4)
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subject to the budget constraint and a no-borrowing constraint
(1 + τc)c1(s1, ε1) + [1− q˜(pmm1, in1)] · pmm1(s1, ε1) + p˜i(in1) + a1(s1, ε1)
≤ e0 +Πt + (1− 0.5τmr)
[
w˜te
ζh1l1(s1, ε1)− 1{in1=1}p˜i(in1)
]− T (y1) (5)
a1(s1, ε1) ≥ 0 (6)
when young;
(1 + τc)c2(s2, ε2) + [1− q˜(pmm2, in2)] · pmm2(s2, ε2) + p˜i(in2) + a2(s2, ε2)
≤ Rt+1a1 +Πt+1 + (1− 0.5τmr)
[
w˜t+1e
ζh2l2(s2, ε2)− 1{in2=1}p˜i(in2)
]− T (y2) (7)
a2(s2, ε2) ≥ 0 (8)
when middle-aged; and
(1 + τc)c3(s3, ε3) + [1− qmr(pmm3)] · pmm3(s3, ε3) + pimr
≤ Rt+2a2 +Πt+2 − T (y3) (9)
when old, where
hg = (1− δh)hg−1 + εg
exp[Amm
ζ
g(sg, εg))]
(10)
w˜t = (1− 0.5τmr)wt (11)
Πt =
(1− α)Yt∑
g={1,2,3} µg
∫
fgdsg
(12)
p˜i(ing) =

piE, if ing = 1
pima, if ing = 2
0 if ing = 3
(13)
q˜(pmm, ing) =

qE(pmm), if ing = 1
qma(pmm), if ing = 2
0 if ing = 3
(14)
yg =

w˜te
ζh1l1(s1, ε1) + Π(σt)− 1{ing=1}p˜i(ing), if g = 1
ra1 + w˜t+1e
ζh2l2(s2, ε2) + Π(σt+1)− 1{ing=1}p˜i(ing), if g = 2
ra2 +Π(σt+2) if g = 3
(15)
The timeline for the generation who was born in period t is shown in Figure 1. Each agent
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Figure 1: Timeline for the generation born in period t
born at t is endowed with e0. They save some storage goods {ag(σt+g−1, sg)}g=1,2 to attain
desirable amounts of consumption. Equation (10) presents the individual’s after-Medicare-
tax adjusted wage rate. Agents survive to the next period with probability ρ(hg). The firm
needs to share the Medicare tax τmr with the agent. Hence, in equilibrium a fraction 0.5τmr
of tax is subtracted from the wage. Profit Πt will be uniformly distributed to the household
as payment as displayed in equation (11). Equations (12) and (13) explain the insurance
premium paid by the individual and the coinsurance rate, which vary with his insurance
state. Income taxes are imposed on the labor income paid to a worker plus accrued interest
on savings and profit from the firm. Equation (14) represents the income tax base, which
depends on the agent’s age. T (·) is a progressive income tax function.
2.7 Aggregate production function
The consumption goods are produced by a neoclassical production function. The aggregate
production function takes a nested Cobb-Douglas specification in the following form.
Yt = AtE
α
t (16)
Et =
∑
g={1,2}
µg(t)
∫ [
eξhg lg(sg, εg)
]
fgdsg (17)
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where At is a total factor productivity, and Et is an aggregate efficiency labor input,
which depends on individual worker’s health status. The firm’s profit maximization problem
is
max
{Et}
AtE
α
t − wtEt. (18)
Profits Πt are distributed back to households in a lump-sum payment.
2.8 The government
I impose a government balanced budget constraint period by period. The government has
three different types of outlays: general public consumption, Medicaid and Medicare ex-
penses. The government collects revenues from various sources: income taxation according
to a progressive tax function T (·), consumption taxation at rate τc, Medicare taxation at rate
τmr, Medicare premium pimr, Medicaid premium pima, and accidental bequests B collected
from deceased agents.
Gt +
∑
g={1,2}
µg(t)
∫
[qma(pmmg)pmmg − pima] · 1{in=3}fgdsg + µ3(t)
∫
[qmr(pmm3)pmm3 − pimr] f3ds3
= RtBt +
∑
g={1,2}
µg(t)
∫
τmr
[
w˜te
ξhg lg − 0.5 · 1{in=1}piE
]
fgdsg +
∑
g={1,2,3}
µg(t)
∫
[τccg + T (yg)] fgdsg
(19)
where yg is the taxable income for age g agent.
2.9 Health insurance company
The health insurance company is competitive. Hence, in equilibrium the premium piE is
charged such that expected expenditures on the insured are precisely covered.
piE =
∑
g={1,2} µg(t)
∫ [
qE(pmmg)pmmg · 1{in=1}
]
fgdsg∑
g={1,2} µg(t)
∫
1{in=1}fgdsg
(20)
Notice the coverage ratio function qE(·) is taken as exogenously given.
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2.10 Stationary competitive equilibrium
Let ih ∈ I2 = {healthy, unhealthy}, x ∈ R+, hg ∈ R+, ima ∈ I2 = {0, 1}, εg ∈ R−. The state
space for age g = {1, 2} year old agents is Sg = I2×R+×R+× I2×R−, and the state space
for the old is S3 = I
2 × R+ × R+ × R−.
Definition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is i) fiscal variables {G, τc, T (·), τmr};
ii) price for medical services pm; iii) health insurance choices {in(sg)}g=1,2, a set of state-
contingent decision rules {cg(sg, εg), ag(sg, εg),mg(sg, εg), Lg(sg, εg)}g=1,2,3 for the agents; iv)
a state-contingent sequence of labor demand E; v) insurance premium piE; vi) distributions
of agents fg(sg) over the state space S such that
1. {in(sg), cg(sg, εg), ag(sg, εg),mg(sg, εg), Lg(sg, εg)}g=1,2,3 solve the consumers problem
(3) taking prices and fiscal variables as given;
2. given the distribution f ∗g of households, the insurance companies choose piE such that
the budget constraint of insurance companies (19) holds;
3. the government sets τmr, and T (·) such that (18) holds;
4. given price w, the labor market clears
E =
∑
g={1,2}
µg
∫
eζhg lg(sg, εg)fgdsg (21)
5. the accidental bequests matches the remaining assets.
B =
∑
g={1,2}
µg
∫
ag(sg, εg) · (1− ρ(hg, εg))fgdsg (22)
6. the aggregate resource constraint holds
G+
∑
g={1,2,3}
µg
∫
[cg(sg, εg) + pmmg(sg, εg)] fgdsg +
∑
g={1,2}
µg
∫
ag(sg, εg)fgdsg
= µ1
∫
e0f1ds1 +
∑
g={1,2}
µg
∫
Rt · ag(sg, εg)fgdsg + Y +B (23)
7. there is a consistency between beliefs and the actual prices.
8. the relative size of age g to the population µg is recursively determined by
µg =
∫
ρ(hg−1, , εg−1)fg−1dsg−1
1 + n
µg−1 (24)
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9. the law of motion for the distribution of agents over the state space S satisfies
f t+1g =
∫
ρ(hg−1, εg−1)f tg−1dsg−1 (25)
3 Calibration
In this section I outline the calibration of the model. Table 8 summarizes the values and
describes the parameters.
Most parameters can be independently estimated. However, there are 16 parameters
that cannot be determined independent of each other as I discuss below. These include
parameters of preference over health (γ3,g, η), the health production function (Am, ζ), the
survival probability function (aρ, bρ), the magnitude of the negative health shock (ε
1, ε2),
the probability distribution of the shock pg,ih and the price of medical service pm. Hence, I
use a minimization procedure to determine these parameter values. More specifically, I pick
parameter values to match key moments in the stationary distribution of the benchmark
model with the real-world statistics listed in Table 12. Formally, let ψ denotes the vector of
parameters, and Γ be the vector of selected real-world moments. Given ψ, a prediction Γˆ(ψ)
on Γ can be computed in the stationary distribution of the benchmark. The minimization
procedure can be defined as the following problem:
min
ψ
∥∥∥Γˆ(ψ)− Γ∥∥∥ (26)
3.1 Data sources
The data used for estimating the process of health insurance decision and health production
come from the Household Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS),
which is based on a series of national surveys conducted by the U.S. Agency for Health Care
Research and Quality (AHRQ). The MEPS consists of eight two-year panels from 1996/1997
up to 2003/2004 and includes data on demographics, income and most importantly health
status and health insurance.
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3.2 Demographics
In the model, one period is defined as 20 years. Agents enter the economy at the age of
25 (g = 1) and survive up to the maximum age of 85 (g = 3). In line with Suen (2006), I
assume that the survival probability function ρ(·) takes the form of the cumulative Weibull
distribution function:
ρ(h) = 1− exp(−aρhbρ) (27)
with aρ > 0 and bρ > 0. The endogenous survival probability rules out the case that agents
survive to the next period with negative health stock.
I consider a yearly population growth of 1.25%. Together with the survival probability
ρ(h), the ratio of retired people to active population (the dependency ratio) is equal to 18.6%
(19.2% according to the 2000 Population Census for the U.S.). The initial level of health
when agent enter the economy, h¯0, is assumed to be constant and is normalized to be 100.
3.3 Preferences and technology
Agents have period utility over consumption, leisure and health:
u(cg, Lg, hg) = log cg + γ2,g logLg + γ3,g
h1−ηg
1− η (28)
The parameter γ2,g is age-dependent and I choose parameter values such that the average
fraction of the time endowment allocated to market work is 0.33, which implies γ2,1 = 1.3,
and γ2,1 = 0.85. Notice old agents retire from the labor market and they spend all time on
leisure. For simplicity I set γ2,3 = γ2,1. γ3,g, which is age-dependent as is γ2,g, measures the
importance of health and η denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion of health.
The annual subjective discount factor is taken to be 0.97, so β = (0.97)20 = 0.5936. The
average annual interest rate in the U.S. is 4%, so r = (1 + 0.04)20 − 1 = 1.19.
3.4 Production of health and health shocks
The health measure h used in this paper is the Physical Component Summary scores formed
from the answers to the Short-Form 12 questions. For people aged between 25 and 85, the
13
lowest health level is 4.56 and the highest level is 72.17 in the MEPS data.5 This paper
assumes that human beings can live up to 85 years without any accident or illness. I choose
δh such that 72.17× (1− δ˜h)60 = 4.56, where δ˜h refers to annual health depreciation rate. I
also assume that the depreciation rate increases with age. Therefore I choose depreciation
rate of {0.4, 0.4, 0.5}.
The transition of agent’s health is described by equation (2). Agents can offset the
negative effect of a health shock by purchasing medical care. The productivity of medical
care is captured by Am, and the price of medical care is pm. Both are exogenously given.
Brown (2006) found that uninsured people in California pay 65% more for common
prescription drugs than the federal government does for the same medications. Anderson
(2007) found that the uninsured patients pay up to 2.5 times for hospital service than health
insurers. I assume that uninsured consumers pay a 60% higher price for medical services
than the insured, so that pum = 1.6× pim. This is similar to Jung and Tran (2008). I assume
that the relative price of medical service pm is the weighted average price paid by the insured
and the uninsured, i.e. pm = (1 − θ)pim + θpum, where θ is the fraction of uninsured in the
population. According to Kaiser (2007), the value of θ was 17% in 2006. Therefore, I pick
pim = 0.9145pm, and p
u
m = 1.4605pm.
I differentiate agents into two groups, which are high-risk and low-risk, by using the
estimation procedure of Bundorf, M. Kate et al (2005). The health shocks take two possible
values {ε1, ε2}. For the same age cohort high-risk people are different from low-risk people
in terms of the probabilities pg,ih(ε) of getting a same shock ε. The health shocks ε ∈ Ωε =
{ε1, ε2} and the probability distribution of the shock pg,ih(ε) are chosen so that the health
insurance take-up rate (percentage of workers buying private insurance per age-type group)
and the share of health expenditure in GDP are approximated.
3.5 Health insurance
Private health insurance Data suggests that the coverage rate increases in the health
expenditures incurred by the patients. Therefore I assume that the coverage ratio is a
function of total health expenditure pmm and takes the following form similar to Jeske and
5As for how to calculate these summary scores, please refer to Ware et al, How to Score the SF-12(r)
Physical and Mental Health Summary Scales, QualityMetric,Inc., Lincoln, RI.
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Kitao (2009).
qE(pmm) = β
E
0 + β
E
1 log(pmm) + β
E
2 [log(pmm)]
2 (29)
First, I estimate the set of parameters {βE0 , βE1 , βE2 } using the MEPS data. Then I
rank the health expenditure and use 5 bins for health expenditure data. I specify the bins
of uniform size. Therefore the first bin contains individuals whose health expenditure is
between zero and 20-quantile. The 20% who spends the most on health care belongs to the
fifth bin. I plug in the health expenditure data to attain the average coverage ratio for each
bin.
The coverage ratios of Medicaid and Medicare are estimated by the same procedure. I
report the parameter values and coverage ratios for each expenditure grid in table 10 and 11.
In table 11, the standard errors in brackets and all coefficient estimates are significant at the
1% level. The insurance premium piE is determined in the equilibrium to ensure zero profits
for the insurance company.
Medicaid I use Medicaid as a proxy of public health insurance for the non-elderly
population, which includes S-CHIP. I use the MEPS data to calculate the acceptance rate of
Medicaid χ = 0.6. The beneficiaries of Medicaid typically do not pay anything for enrolling
in the program. I pick pima = 0 in the simulation.
Medicaid is funded by general government revenue. The income level characteristic of
Medicaid is typically 100% to 133% of the federal poverty line (FPL).6 I set Yma = $13, 000
or about 34% of annual per capita GDP in the benchmark.
Medicare I assume that every old agent is enrolled in Medicare. Medicare taxes are
levied on all labor income and split between employer and employee contributions. The Medi-
care premium was $799.20 annually in 2004 or about 2.11% of annual GDP. The Medicare
tax rate τmr is determined within the model so that the government budget is balanced.
3.6 Firms
I choose a standard labor share in production of α = 0.66 from NIPA. Without loss of
generality, total factor productivity is normalized to A = 8 such that the average labor
6Source: Genevieve M. Kenney, Jennifer M. Haley, Alexandra Tebay. Children’s Insurance Coverage and
Service Use Improve. Urban Institute. July 31, 2003. http://www.urban.org/publications/310816.html.
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income equals 10 in the benchmark. In line with Bloom and Canning (2005), I assume
that individual worker’s health status affects the efficiency of labor input by a factor of eξh.
Therefore, labor income is given by weξhl, where w is the average wage rate. I estimate the
parameter ξ that fits the following equation using the MEPS data.
log(LaborIncome) = ξh+ log(AverageWage×WorkingHours) + ² (30)
where h is the Physical Component Summary scores that measure the individual’s health
status ranging from 0 to 100. I normalize the average labor income observed in the data to
be 10.0 and I calculate ξ = 0.1393 in the benchmark.
3.7 Government
The value for G is exogenously given and is fixed across all policy experiments. I calibrate it
to 27.5% to match the share of government consumption, social security and gross investment
excluding transfers, at federal, state and local levels (The Economic Report of the President,
2004). The consumption tax rate is 5.67% as in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
The income tax function follows the functional form studied by Gouveia and Strauss
(1994), which is given as
T (y) = b0
(
y − (y−b1 + b2)−1/b1
)
+ τyy (31)
Parameter b0 is the limit of marginal taxes in the progressive part as income goes to infin-
ity, b1 denotes the curvature of marginal taxes and b2 is a scaling parameter. I use the param-
eters estimated by Gouveia and Struss (1994), which are {b0, b1, b2} = {0.258, 0.768, 0.716}.
When they calibrate the tax function, the income has been normalized to the range of [0, 1].
In my model, I divide taxable income of every agent by the maximum income observed in
the simulated economy to get the normalized income. Then I use this normalized income
directly in equation (30) to get the tax rate. The parameter τy in the proportional term of
the income tax equals 10% in the benchmark.
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4 Numerical results
In this section, I will first discuss the features of my benchmark model. Then I conduct
counterfactual experiments in which alternative policies are carried out.
4.1 Benchmark model
Table 12 reports the main features of the benchmark simulation. Under the baseline param-
eterizations the model is able to match the health insurance demand and aggregate health
expenditure in the U.S. The fraction of insured agents among all young and middle-aged
agents is 84.8%, which is slightly higher than 83.0% in the data. Among non-elderly, 12.3%
are covered by the Medicaid program (12.9% in the data). The model overstates total health
expenditure as a ratio of GDP, which is about 16.3% according to the Department of Health
& Human Services (2006). The model reports 16.6%, which can be justified by the fact
that there is no individual health insurance available in the model. Individuals who have
insurance through their employer usually incur larger amount health expenditure than those
purchase insurance in the private market according to MEPS data.
My model does not match the wealth distribution accurately even though I introduce
idiosyncratic health shock. This can be explained by the fact that agents do not have bequest
motive and the profits generated from production have been uniformly distributed back as
a lump sum payment in the model economy. Nevertheless, the accuracy of approximation of
the entire wealth distribution won’t impose strong effect on the prediction of health insurance
demand, which will be determined by the fraction of the population whose wealth is below
certain threshold. As described in the previous paragraph, the health insurance take-up
profile and aggregate health expenditure match with the data fairly well. Therefore I leave
the current setting as it is. The following table shows the Gini coefficient and quantiles of
the wealth distribution in the U.S. and in the benchmark economy.
Economy Gini First Second Third Fourth Fifth
U.S. 0.78 -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49
Benchmark 0.53 0.84 4.80 13.21 28.27 52.89
Table 1: The distribution of wealth
Next, I examine the model’s predictions on the life-cycle patterns of medical spending and
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consumption. Panel 1 of Figure 2 displays medical spending over various age groups with the
same statistics from the MEPS. Both in the data and model, the average health expenditure
is roughly constant between ages 25 and 64 and climbs afterwards. The benchmark model is
able to replicate the increasing pattern. However, the size of the health expenditure of non-
elderly agents as a ratio of GDP is bigger than the one observed in the data. The main reason
is that the agent enters the economy with same amount of health stock in the model. The
labor productivity effect of health may overstate the investment in medical service among
young agents. This can be resolved by introducing heterogeneity in initial health but with
some extra computational cost. In the model, a representative agent age between 25 and 44
spends $5, 697 or about 14.5% of per capita GDP (7.5% in the data). Agents between ages
45 and 64 years old on average spend $6, 783, or about 12.7% of per capita GDP (11.0% in
the data). Agents over 65 spend $13, 283, or about 29.8% of per capita GDP (32.6% in the
data).
Panel 2 of Figure 2 shows the consumption over various age groups. Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2002) estimated the life-cycle consumption profiles using data from the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey. They found that non-durable consumption peaked at age 52
and was about 29% higher than at age 25. The current model is able to generate a simi-
lar hump-shaped pattern. However, there is a gap between the benchmark prediction and
data. This can be attributed to the fact that there is no capital in the model for the sake
of simplification. The direct consequence of this strategy is that the demand for saving is
inelastic and therefore part of the government income taxation is distortion free as discussed
in section 4.3.
4.2 Policy experiments
I now conduct experiments to determine the effect of reforming the health insurance system.
All potential reforms start from the same initial steady state of the benchmark economy.
In period 1, an unanticipated change of the policy is announced and implemented and the
economy starts to make a transition to the new steady state. I first compare moments of
associated invariant distributions. Then I discuss the quantitative aspects of the transitions
and welfare analysis associated with each of the reforms considered.
I am interested in changes in health expenditure as a ratio of GDP, the change in taxes
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Figure 2: Health expenditure and consumption life profiles
that balances the government budget, aggregate labor supply, aggregate health status, sav-
ings rate output as well as welfare implication. I treat changes in government revenue as
follows: expenditures G, consumption tax rate τc, the progressive part of income tax func-
tion T (·) and the medicare tax τmr remain unchanged from the benchmark. I adjust the
proportional income tax rate τy to balance the government’s budget.
In each experiment I first compute a steady state outcome under the stationary equilib-
rium and then the transition dynamics. In line with Conesa and Krueger (1999), I measure
the welfare effect of a reform by computing the consumption equivalent variation (CEV ).
I quantify the welfare change of a given policy reform for an individual of type (ih, x, ima)
by asking by how much (in percent) this individual’s consumption has to be increased in all
future periods and contingencies (keeping health expenditure, leisure and health insurance
status constant) in the old steady state so that his expected life-time utility equals that under
a specific policy reform. I denote it with CEV (ih, x, ima). For example, a CEV (ih, x, ima)
of −10% implies that if the given policy reform is put into place, then an individual of type
(ih, x, ima) will experience a welfare loss due to the reform equivalent to sacrifice 10% of his
consumption in the initial steady state with leisure, health insurance and health expenditure
constant at the initial choices.
Alternative sources of revenue to fund these reforms are also considered. I first consider
19
supporting the reform by adjusting the income tax. I also conduct companion experiments
where the government funds the reform through a labor income tax and through a lump-sum
transfer separately.
4.2.1 Policy experiment A: expansion of Medicare to the entire population
In this experiment the private health insurance and the Medicaid program are abolished.
Non-elderly will be covered by a uniform health insurance program, which is sponsored by
the government, with premium pimr and coverage rate qE(·). Specifically, non-elderly pay for
a premium that equals 2.1% of the per capita GDP, which is cheaper than the counterpart
in the benchmark.7 A fraction qE(pmm) of their health expenditure will be paid by the
government.
I assume that the average price level for medical service pm and medical technology Am
are constant and exogenously given. I can also consider a case in which the technology slows
down (or speeds up) as a result of the reform.
Experiment results are summarized in Table 2. The top section displays some statistics
of aggregate variables: the fraction of insured non-elderly, the Medicare tax rate, the average
effective income tax rate, average hours worked, average effective working hours, and the
health expenditure as a ratio of GDP. The lower section displays the welfare effects of each
reform. % w/ CEV > 0 indicates the fraction of agents in the benchmark that would
experience a welfare gain (positive CEV ) if the alternative reform is taken place.
Expansion of Medicare to the entire population achieves a universal coverage as shown
in the fraction of insured non-elderly. The aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP
increases by 0.3%. This is attributed to the fact that those newly insured non-elderly will
utilize more medical service and incur higher amount of health expenditure as the reform
provides them with cheaper health insurance. The current reform needs to raise tax revenue
to cover 15.2% of the non-elderly who would be uninsured in the benchmark and to pay
for part of the expenditure of the previously insured, who pay a premium of pimr after the
reform, which is about 20.0% of the premium they paid before the reform. The reform also
saves some tax revenues through changes in the arrangement in the health care sector. In
the benchmark, the government provides Medicaid to the low incomes, which costs 2.2% of
7In the benchmark, 72.5% of non-elderly who purchase private insurance pay an actuarially fair premium
piE , which is about 10.9% of the per capita GDP.
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total GDP. It also subsidizes the purchase of group insurance and the total subsidy amounts
to 0.8% of total GDP. Once the reform is implemented, the government can save these
spending, since both Medicaid and private insurance are abolished. Put them together, the
government raises the proportional income tax rate by 4.5%, which will discourage labor
supply. At the meantime, the individuals have access to better health insurance. Average
health has been improved, which brings workers higher productivity and incentive to work
longer. Consequently, average hours worked decreases by 4.8% to 28.7 hours per week. Total
output decreases by 2.0% as labor supply shrinks and average consumption decreases by
3.0%.
Now let’s look at the saving behavior. The average health stock of the non-elderly
increases, which implies a longer life expectancy and a stronger saving incentive. A decreased
exposure to the health shocks lowers the demand for precautionary saving, but this effect is
dominated by the previous one and the aggregate saving rate slightly increases by 0.8%.
Although agents are subject to a higher income tax after the reform is implemented, the
cheaper health insurance program from the government is enough to compensate this cost
for most agents. As shown in % w/ CEV > 0, 72.6% of agents would experience a welfare
gain from this reform, and the average welfare effect is in the order of 2.6% in terms of
consumption in all states. However, low income agents, especially those covered by Medicaid
before the reform, will suffer from this policy because the new insurance program from such a
reform is less generous than Medicaid. On average, low income individuals would experience
a welfare loss equivalent to 4.3% of consumption. Compared to agents who have income
above the poverty line have a welfare gain equivalent to 6.0% of consumption.
In order to understand whether there exists a Pareto-improving variation of the above
reform, I also consider experiment A-2. This experiment is similar to A-1 except that all
low income agents are covered by Medicaid program. Under such reform, the tax rate needs
a bigger increase since the health insurance provided to the low income is more generous
than the one in experiment A-1. Consequently, they will consume higher amount of medical
services which drives aggregate health expenditure to rise. Nevertheless, the benefit from
such a guaranteed Medicaid coverage cannot offset the loss due to a higher tax rate, which is
required to provide generous Medicaid program to low income agents. As shown in CEV from
transition, agents with income lower than the poverty line still experience a welfare loss, but
at a much smaller magnitude of 1.4%. The welfare gain of higher income agents decreases to
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4.9% from 5.9% in experiment A-1. On average, agents have a welfare gain in the order of
2.8% in terms of consumption in all states. From this experiment, it seems possible to make
expansion of Medicare a Pareto-improving program by appropriately funding the reform.
Bench. A-1 A-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84.8 100.0 100.0
Medicare tax (in %) 2.5 2.5 2.5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24.6 29.4 30.4
Ave. Working hrs. 30.6 28.7 28.5
Ave. Effective Working hrs. 61.1 57.3 57.0
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16.6 16.9 17.7
piE (in % of per capita GDP) 10.1 2.1 2.1
Output 100.0 98.0 98.1
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25.8 26.6 26.9
Average consumption 100.0 97.1 95.6
Average health stock 46.6 46.9 46.8
Lifetime CEV after transition
all (in %) − 2.6 2.8
income > Yma (in %) − 5.9 4.9
income ≤ Yma (in %) − −4.3 −1.4
% w/ CEV > 0 − 72.6 76.7
Table 2: Policy Experiment A
A-1: Medicare expansion to the entire population.
A-2: Medicare expansion and keeping Medicaid.
4.2.2 Policy experiment B: expansion of public health insurance
Reform B involves expansion of the public health insurance, including Medicaid/S-CHIP
[Gruber (2006)]. Approaches that follow this model generally build on existing public pro-
grams by raising income limits to include more needy people and do away with all tests of
eligibility except income. In experiment B-1, I increase the Medicaid offer rate to χ = 1,
compared to a probability of 0.6 in the benchmark, i.e. the new Medicaid program covers
all the low income but not just eligible low income parents and children as required in the
current system. While in experiment B-2, I leave categorical requirement of Medicaid un-
changed and increase the maximum income requirement to 300% of the poverty line. I report
experiment results in Table 3.
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The spending in Medicaid as a ratio of GDP increases from 1.7% to 2.5% when the
government extends Medicaid to include all low income. These newly insured consume more
medical services because Medicaid provides them with better insurance coverage. Aggregate
health expenditure increases by 0.3% and the proportional income tax rate has been raised
by 1.5% to match this spending. Average hours worked decreases by 1.3% even though the
labor productivity has been improved due to better health. Medicaid expansion alone cannot
achieve “universal health care”. This reform will leave 10.5% of the non-elderly without
insurance coverage. Those are agents in better health condition who think insurance is not
critical important to them.
When the government increases the maximum income requirement in experiment B-
2, some previously insured agents will choose to apply for Medicaid because Medicaid is
the best insurance money can buy, even though they will face the risk of being uninsured
because of the categorical requirement of Medicaid. Consequently, the insured as a fraction
of non-elderly decreases to 81.2%. Similar to the preceding experiment, the aggregate health
expenditure increases but with a slightly bigger magnitude since the generous Medicaid needs
to cover a larger fraction(18.0%) of the non-elderly population. Average health outcome is
better than after experiment B-1 is taken place. Nevertheless, the aggregate hours worked
decreases by 3.0% as income tax has been increased by 6.0% to fund this reform.
Compared to the benchmark, policy B-1 is intended to be beneficial for agents with income
below the poverty line. These agents are qualified to Medicaid with a certain probability
determined by the categorical requirement of this program in the benchmark. Now they
benefit from this reform with a guaranteed public insurance coverage and pay a cost in
terms of a higher income tax. Given the small size of the program, the benefit is enough
to compensate for the loss due to the tax increment. They experience a welfare gain in the
order of 1.3% in terms of consumption in all states. For high income agents, their health
benefits are intact after the reform since they are not qualify for Medicaid, but they subject
to a higher income tax to support the expanded Medicaid program. Their welfare loss is
equivalent to 1.1% in terms of consumption in all states.
It is interesting to compare policy B-1 with A-2 especially for poor agents. Even though
both reforms provide a guaranteed Medicaid to low income agents, they will vote for B-1
since this policy only incurs a slight increase in income tax to expand Medicaid to a small
fraction of the population.
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To increase the maximum income requirement makes everybody worse off. Agents whose
income is below the existing maximum income requirement have the same public insurance
coverage as in the benchmark. However they are required to pay for a higher tax rate to
fund the expanded Medicaid. As a consequence, they experience a welfare loss of the order
of 2.7% in terms of consumption in all states. High income agents benefit from the reform
with a chance of being covered by Medicaid depending on their income level. While the
cost of higher income tax cannot be offset by this benefit. Consequently, they experience a
welfare loss of the order of 1.6% in terms of consumption, which is in a smaller magnitude
compared with low income agents who do not benefit from this reform.
Bench. B-1 B-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84.8 89.5 81.2
Medicare tax (in %) 2.5 2.5 2.5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24.6 25.9 30.6
Ave. Working hrs. 30.6 30.2 29.7
Ave. Effective Working hrs. 61.1 60.4 59.3
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16.6 17.0 17.4
piE (in % of per capita GDP) 10.8 10.8 9.7
Output 100.0 99.9 98.7
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25.8 25.9 27.2
Average consumption 100.0 99.2 97.1
Average health stock 46.6 46.7 46.8
Lifetime CEV after transition
all (in %) − −0.3 −2.4
income > Yma (in %) − −1.1 −1.6
income ≤ Yma (in %) − 1.3 −2.7
% w/ CEV > 0 − 11.0 0.0
Table 3: Policy Experiment B
B-1: Public health insurance expansion 1.
B-2: Public health insurance expansion 2.
4.2.3 Policy experiment C: individual mandate
In this experiment those agents who are uninsured in the benchmark are forced to purchase
private insurance. Their entry into the insurance market makes the risk pool more inclusive
and drives the insurance premium to drop by 12.0%. The aggregate health expenditure as
a ratio of GDP rises to 17.1% as the insurance coverage increases. The aggregate health
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status becomes better and the average working hours increases by 0.2% even though the
reform requires an higher income tax rate since the tax deductibility has been extended to
previously uninsured. In terms of welfare, an individual mandate makes everybody worse off.
Such a reform imposes a higher income tax rate since more individuals will deduct premiums
from income taxes. This cost cannot be offset by the cheaper insurance resulting from a
more inclusive risk pool. On average, agents experience welfare loss at the order of 0.6%
of consumption in all states. Among low income agents, only a small fraction holds private
insurance since most of them are covered by Medicaid. Consequently they benefit less from
the cheaper insurance and they experience a welfare loss at the magnitude of 1.3% in terms
of consumption in all states, compared with a loss at the order of 0.3% for high income
agents.
Bench. C
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84.8 100.0
Medicare tax (in %) 2.5 2.5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24.6 25.2
Ave. Working hrs. 30.6 30.7
Ave. Effective Working hrs. 61.1 61.3
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16.6 17.1
piE (in % of per capita GDP) 10.8 9.5
Output 100.0 100.2
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25.8 26.7
Average consumption 100.0 99.1
Average health stock 46.6 47.1
Lifetime CEV after transition
all (in %) − −0.6
income > Yma (in %) − −0.3
income ≤ Yma (in %) − −1.3
% w/ CEV > 0 − 0.0
Table 4: Policy Experiment C
4.2.4 Policy experiment D: abolishing tax deductibility of private insurance
premiums and providing a tax credit
Compared with the above experiments, policy experiment D-1 is a market-based reform
rather than a government program. Under this experiment, the deductibility of the insurance
premium for income tax is removed. The taxable income does not depend on the insurance
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status and it is given as follows
yg =

w˜te
ζh1l1(s1, ε1) + Π(σt), if g = 1
ra1(s1, ε1) + w˜te
ζh2l2(s2, ε2) + Π(σt), if g = 2
ra2(s2, ε3) + Π(σt) if g = 3
(32)
Experiment results are summarized in Table 5. Removing the subsidy in D-1 leads to a
partial collapse of the private insurance market as found by Jeske and Kitao (2009). The
fraction of non-elderly who purchase private insurance falls from 72.5% to 37.5%.8 More than
1/3 of the non-elderly opt out of the private insurance market and choose to be self-insured.
Those are healthy agents who face a lower probability of suffering a bad health shock. The
exit of these agents out of the insurance market deteriorates the risk pool and the price of the
private insurance jumps by 15%. The aggregate health expenditure as a ratio of GDP falls
by 1.2% because taking away the tax deductibility reduces over-investment in health. The
income tax rate falls as the income base increases with the removal of the tax deductability
for premium. Average working hours slightly increase by 0.5%.
In experiment D-2, the government replace the tax deduction with a $2, 500 credit that
does not depend on income as proposed in McCain’s health care plan. The tax deduction
favors the wealthy since they have a higher marginal income tax rate. A tax credit creates
incentives for individuals to purchase private insurance. The fraction of insured non-elderly
jumps to 94.2%. Consequently, the price of private insurance falls to 9.7% of per capita GDP
and the health expenditure rises to 16.9% of GDP.
In terms of welfare, the removal of the tax deductability is welfare improving, as 74.0%
of the young would experience a welfare gain. This reform improves the social welfare by
providing a better allocation of available resource including health care and leisure time.9 It
also benefits agents with a lower tax rate on income. These are enough to compensate for
the welfare loss due to the lower insurance coverage and increased exposure to health shocks.
On average a young individual will experience a welfare gain in the order of 1.8% in terms of
8This experiment is identical to experiment A in Jeske and Kitao (2009). My numerical simulation
suggests a bigger drop in insurance takeup is bigger than reported in their paper. This is consistent with what
they predicted “adding endogenous health expenditure,..., in response to eliminating the tax deductibility,
healthy agents will respond more elastically.”
9This paper complements Jeske and Kitao (2009) by allowing for two additional margins, namely endoge-
nous health expenditure and labor-leisure choices. Numerical simulation finds quite different result from
the same experiment as in their paper. They reported a welfare loss in the order of 0.34% in consumption
equivalence.
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consumption in all states. In D-2, A tax credit to private insurance buyers would encourage
health insurance market participation. The proportional tax rate τy is higher than in the
benchmark due to the tax credit. The welfare loss from tax distortion cannot be offset by
the benefit from the decreased exposure to health shocks. A typical consumer would have a
welfare loss equivalent to 0.2% in terms of consumption in all states.
Bench. D-1 D-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84.8 49.1 94.2
Medicare tax (in %) 2.5 2.5 2.5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24.6 23.1 27.5
Ave. Working hrs. 30.6 30.8 29.8
Ave. Effective Working hrs. 61.1 61.2 59.4
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16.6 15.4 16.9
piE (in % of per capita GDP) 10.8 12.1 9.7
Output 100.0 100.1 99.2
Aggregate saving rate (in %) 25.8 25.76 26.2
Average consumption 100.0 102.4 98.3
Average health stock 46.6 46.4 46.8
Lifetime CEV after transition
all (in %) − 1.76 −0.2
income > Yma (in %) − 1.58 0.8
income ≤ Yma (in %) − 2.1 −2.3
% w/ CEV > 0 − 74.0 67.1
Table 5: Policy Experiment D
D-1: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base.
D-2: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide tax credit
for purchasing private insurance.
4.3 Alternative approaches of funding the reforms
4.3.1 To fund reforms by a labor income tax
In order to understand how the macroeconomic effects of these proposals change in response
to how the government finances the reform, I also consider funding the reform by changing
the Medicare tax τmr. Now, government expenditure G, consumption tax rate τc and the
progressive part of income tax function T (·), as well as the proportional tax rate τy remain
unchanged from the benchmark. The government adjusts the Medicare tax rate τmr to
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balance the budget.
As shown in average working hours in table 6, to fund the reform through labor income
tax creates stronger distortions compared with income taxes.10 Notice I change some policy
targets in order to make the experiment meaningful. In experiment A, the Medicare premium
doubles from 2.1% of GDP to 4.2%. Otherwise the labor income tax rate will skyrocket and
partially crash the labor market as some agents will leave the market. To finance the reform
with labor income tax requires τmr to increases from 2.5% to 7.9%. As a consequence, average
hours worked decreases by 5.6%. The welfare of a typical agent decreases compared to the
case when the government finances the reform through the gross income tax.
Bench. A-1 A-2 B-1 B-2 C D-1 D-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84.8 100.0 100.0 89.5 84.6 100.0 49.1 74.7
Medicare tax (in %) 2.5 7.9 11.2 7.8 2.7 5.6 −7.8 9.3
Ave. income tax (in %) 24.6 24.7 24.5 24.1 24.6 24.2 26.2 24.6
Ave. Working hrs. 30.6 28.9 27.8 29.2 30.5 30.1 32.7 28.9
Ave. Effective Working hrs. 61.1 57.7 55.8 58.4 60.9 60.2 64.9 57.5
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16.6 16.8 17.7 17.1 16.6 17.1 15.3 16.3
piE (in % of GDP) 10.8 4.2 4.2 10.1 10.1 9.7 12.2 10.5
Average consumption 100.0 97.2 95.1 97.4 99.9 98.0 105.9 95.8
Average health stock 46.6 46.9 46.8 46.7 46.8 47.4 46.4 46.4
Lifetime CEV after transition
all(in %) − 1.8 2.5 −1.6 1.1 −1.3 3.8 −3.5
income > Yma − 5.5 4.4 −1.9 3.1 0.8 2.9 −2.9
income ≤ Yma − −5.6 1.3 −0.9 0.1 −2.5 5.8 −4.8
% w/ CEV > 0 − 72.6 76.7 9.6 15.1 0.0 75.3 0.0
Table 6: Policy Experiments - labor income tax
A-1: Medicare expansion to the entire population.
A-2: Medicare expansion with Medicaid.
B-1: Public health insurance expansion 1.
B-2: Public health insurance expansion 2.
C: Individual mandate.
D-1: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base.
10There is no capital in my model. The profit Π is distributed back to the agent as a payment, which is
inelastic supply to the individual. The interest rate is exogenous and the demand for saving is inelastic as
well. Furthermore, the tax base of income tax is broader than labor income tax. These facts explain why
taxing labor income creates more distortion than taxing gross income.
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D-2: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide tax credit
for purchasing private insurance.
Given the relatively small size of the Medicaid program, public insurance expansion
(experiment B-1, B-2) requires a gradual increase in the Medicare tax. Average hours worked
decrease by 4.6% in B-1 and 6.5% in B-2 (1.3% and 0.9% when the reforms are funded through
income taxes). Again, welfare decreases compared to the experiments when the government
funds the reform through an income tax.
Similar to experiment A, I reduce the tax credit to $500 in D-1 and D-2. When reform
D-1 is funded through the labor income tax, a larger tax rate drop (because of the smaller
tax base of labor income) leads to a 6.7% rise in average working hours. The typical agent
experiences a welfare gain whose magnitude is twice than in the case when the reform is
funded by income tax. Now let’s look at the experiment D-2. Even though the tax credit
is much smaller than in the case when the reform is funded through income tax, we still
observe a 3.3% drop in hours worked. All of these suggest that to fund the reforms through
labor income tax creates stronger distortion.
4.3.2 To fund reforms by a lump-sum transfer
The analysis so far indicates that the change in taxes may play a dominant role in how
health care reforms affect the macroeconomy. In order to isolate the effect of tax distortion,
I also conducted companion exercises in which the government funds the reform through a
lump sum transfer. In the companion experiments, the tax rates are kept intact as in the
benchmark. The government returns a lump sum transfer to each individual. The transfer
is determined so that the government’s budget is balanced.
Numerical results in Table 7 indicate that the labor supply effect of health care reforms
is rather small. The greatest change in hours worked is observed in experiment D-1, in
which the hours worked decreases by 2.3%, compared to an average 4.0% change when the
reforms are funded through the income tax. Nevertheless, reforms to the health insurance
system have quite sizeable effects on the welfare. Medicare expansion increases welfare
by improving health status and reducing adverse selection in the health insurance market.
While expansion of Medicaid and individual mandate decreases welfare by distorting health
insurance purchase and health expenditure decision, even thought average health status has
been improved after reforms are carried out.
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Overall, reforms that can decrease the number of uninsured (as in A-1, A-2, B-1, C, and
D-2) will improve the aggregate health status. As the insured consume more medical service,
the aggregate health spending rises as well. Better health encourages labor supply as labor
productivity increases following improved health. As shown in experiment C, average hours
worked increases by 0.7% as average health increases by 0.5%. Among the reforms I consid-
ered, only experiment B-2 and D-1 fail to decrease the number of the uninsured. Aggregate
health expenditure decreases as fewer people have insurance coverage in experiment D-1.
The average health stock falls as well. In experiment D-1, poorer health discourages labor
supply and the average hours worked decreases by 2.3%, which is non-eligible.
Bench. A-1 A-2 B-1 B-2 C D-1 D-2
Insured non-elderly (in %) 84.8 100.0 100.0 89.5 80.4 100.0 49.1 94.2
Medicare tax (in %) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Ave. income tax (in %) 24.6 25.4 25.4 24.7 25.0 24.6 25.2 25.3
Ave. Working hrs. 30.6 30.5 30.6 30.7 31.1 30.8 29.9 30.7
Ave. Effective Working hrs. 61.1 60.9 61.2 61.3 61.9 61.5 59.4 61.2
Health exp. (in % of GDP) 16.6 16.7 17.5 17.0 17.3 16.8 15.5 16.8
piE (in % of GDP) 10.1 2.1 2.1 10.1 9.7 9.7 11.2 9.6
Average consumption 100.0 99.3 98.6 99.8 98.9 99.6 101.2 99.6
Average health stock 46.6 46.8 46.9 46.7 46.8 47.0 46.3 46.8
Lifetime CEV after transition
all (in %) − 2.7 3.0 0.3 −2.5 −0.4 1.8 −0.1
income > Yma − 6.0 4.9 −1.1 −1.4 −0.1 1.6 0.8
income ≤ Yma − −3.9 −0.9 1.5 −3.0 −0.9 2.1 −2.1
% w/ CEV > 0 − 72.6 76.7 11.0 0.0 5.5 73.9 67.1
Table 7: Policy Experiments - Lump sum transfer
A-1: Medicare expansion to the entire population.
A-2: Medicare expansion with Medicaid.
B-1: Public health insurance expansion 1.
B-2: Public health insurance expansion 2.
C: Individual mandate.
D-1: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base.
D-2: Abolish private insurance deductibility from income tax base and provide tax credit
for purchasing private insurance.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I build up a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model to study the
impact of alternative health care reforms on the aggregate labor supply, health expenditures,
savings, welfare, and the fraction of uninsured population. In contrast to some papers in
the literature, I consider a model with a labor-leisure choice as well as a health expenditure
decision. These latter choices may change the demand for medical services, which in turn
affects the individual’s health status and labor productivity. Moreover, financing reform may
create distortions on the labor supply by requiring additional tax revenues. The magnitude
of the distortion depends on the details of the reform as well as the funding method.
The following important tradeoffs should be considered when evaluating alternative ap-
proaches to reform the U.S. health insurance system: the reduction in the number of unin-
sured population, labor market distortions, and the cost of raising public funds to cover
government programs. These complicated tradeoffs can only be fully captured in a general
equilibrium framework, similar to the one employed in my analysis. My results suggest that
the Medicare expansion and the individual mandate are good candidates for achieving uni-
versal health care, while a removal of the tax subsidy to purchase private insurance would
result in a significant reduction in the insurance coverage. For all proposals studied, the
aggregate health expenditure rises as the insured population increases. Funding the reform
through payroll taxes does not seem promising because such a policy can heavily distort the
labor market, especially in the cases of expanding Medicare or providing a tax credit to the
insured.
Depending on the details of the reforms and how they are funded, I find that the impact
of various reforms on the aggregate labor supply ranges between −9.1% and 6.8%. In some
reforms, such as the expansion of Medicare to the entire population and the expansion of
Medicaid, cheaper insurance means a better health risk pool, lower premiums and better
health, which in turn increases labor productivity and hours worked. However, some reforms
require higher taxes which result in lower working hours, as for instance in the expansion
of Medicare and the individual mandate. The expansion of Medicaid funded with income
taxes results in the smallest change in hours worked because the government only needs to
collect tax revenue to include about 5% of the non-elderly into the public insurance program.
Conversely, the change with the strongest impact on hours worked is the removal of the tax
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subsidy to purchase the group insurance funded through the labor tax. This is because a
larger fraction of non-elderly (72.5%) pay a tax for the insurance premium, which is income
tax free in the benchmark. Consequently, a lower labor tax rate is needed to balance the
government budget.
I also find that an increase in insurance coverage does not always improve social welfare.
Here, social welfare is measured in terms of the consumption equivalent variation (CEV),
and the impact of various reforms varies between −3.5% and 3.8%. Both Medicare expansion
and the individual mandate can achieve universal insurance coverage. Medicare expansion
improves the aggregate welfare by offering cheaper insurance. In contrast, the individual
mandate may deteriorate welfare even though the risk pooling becomes more inclusive and the
premiums go down as agents are forced to purchase insurance. In this case, the government
needs to increase other taxes so that the newly insured can enjoy the subsidy for purchasing
insurance. In the case of the removal of the tax subsidy to purchase private insurance, agents
become better off by providing a better allocation of available resource including health care
and leisure time and lowering the tax rate, which is enough to compensate the cost due to
the lower insurance coverage and increased exposure to health shocks.
Since the purpose of the paper is to focus on the effects of reforming the health insurance
system, I have chosen not to alter the health production sector along the transition. However,
as the demand for medical services may change after a reform is implemented, the supply
side may be affected as well. An interesting extension of the current paper would be to ask
how productivity in the medical sector and the price of medical services are determined and
how they will be affected by these health insurance reforms.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Computation algorithm to stationary equilibrium
Given the parameter values as shown in the text, I compute the stationary equilibrium as
follows:
Step 1. Discretize the state space S = (ih, x, h, ima, ε).
Step 2. Start with an arbitrary pair of the steady state values of aggregate labor
supply E, tax rate τmr, bequest B, and private health insurance premium piE. Define
Θ = {E, τmr, B, piE}. Compute the value of wage w.
Step 3. Agents solve their optimization problem.
Step 4. Simulate the economy:
4.1. Set t = 0, there are Nppl agents live in the economy, who are randomly assigned the
values of (ih, x, hg−1, ima, εg) if young or middle-aged, and (ih, x, hg−1, εg) if retired.
4.2. Given shocks agents choose whether to insure, how much to save, and how much to
spend;
4.3. New period starts, t = t+1, g = g+1, the government collects the assets left behind
by the accidentally deceased.
4.4. A sequence of time series is generated by repeating step 4.2 & 4.3;
4.5. Store the distribution of {(ih, x, hg, ima, εg, ing)}3g=1 with {Ψg}3g=1;
4.6. Stop the process if the economy enters the stationary distribution.
Step 5. Compute the insurance premium pinewE , aggregate labor supply E
new, bequest
Bnew, and tax rate τnewmr based on the distribution {Ψg}3g=1 according to equations (19), (16),
(21), and (18). Denote Θ′ = {Enew, τnewmr , Bnew, pinewE }.
Step 6. Find the fixed point of Θ by iteration. If ‖Θ′ −Θ‖ > δ, set Θ = (Θ+Θ′)
2
and
return to step 3. Otherwise set Θ∗ = Θ′ and define
cg = Gcg(in, ih, x, hg−1, ima, εg; Θ
∗) (33)
lg = Glg(in, ih, x, hg−1, ima, εg; Θ
∗) (34)
mg = Gmg(in, ih, x, hg−1, ima, εg; Θ
∗) (35)
ag = Gag(in, ih, x, hg−1, ima, εg; Θ
∗) (36)
ing = Gin(ih, x, hg−1, ima, εg; Θ∗) (37)
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6.2 Calibration
Table 8: Parameters of the model
Parameter Description Values
n population growth rate 1.25%
{aρ, bρ} parameters in survival probability {0.35895, 1.0}
β discount factor 0.97
γ2,g preference on leisure {1.3, 0.85, 1.3}
γ3,g preference on health {0.05, 0.5, 2.5}
η relative risk aversion over health 1.35
{Am, ϑ} health production {1.96, 0.52}
ξ parameter in health on labor 0.1393
εg health shock see table 9
δh health depreciation see text
pm price for medical service see text
A total factor productivity 8.0
α labor share 0.66
r interest rate 4%
{b0, b1, b2} income tax parameters (progressive part) {0.258, 0.768, 0.716}
τy income tax parameter (proportional part) 10%
τc consumption tax 5.67%
τmr medicare tax 2.5%
G government expenditure 27.5% of GDP
qma(·) Medicaid coverage rate see text
pima Medicaid premium see text
qmr(·) Medicare coverage rate see text
pimr Medicare premium see text
qE(·) private insurance coverage rate see text
piE private insurance premium see text
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Table 9: Health shocks by age group
Age Shock 1 Shock 2
25-44 −0.5 −10.0
45-64 −2.5 −10.0
65-85 −10.0 −20.0
Table 10: Coverage ratio for each expenditure grids
bin 1 2 3 4 5
qE(pmm) 0.55487 0.61017 0.65671 0.70503 0.78060
qma(pmm) 0.76524 0.81319 0.85763 0.88673 0.94784
qmr(pmm) 0.49942 0.57952 0.63345 0.69578 0.77799
Table 11: Parameter values in the coverage ratio functions
qE qma qmr
β0 0.63632(0.00144) 0.83671(0.00353) 0.51344(0.00416)
β1 0.05444(0.00079) 0.02315(0.00165) 0.03223(0.00266)
β2 0.00546(0.00371) 0.00349(0.00067) 0.01477(0.00094)
R2 0.0863 0.0475 0.1634
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6.3 Numerical results
Table 12: Data vs. model
Parameters Data Benchmark
All insured (in % of non-elderly) 83.0 84.8
w/ Private insurance (in % of non-elderly) 71.1 72.5
w/ Medicaid (in % of non-elderly) 12.9 12.3
Health Expenditures (in % of GDP) 16.3 16.6
Labor supply (in % of total time) 33.3 30.6
Ratio of retired to active population (in %) 19.2 18.0
Marginal income tax at 10% quantile 15.0 20.0
Marginal income tax at 50% quantile 26.0 25.4
Marginal income tax at 99% quantile 35.0 27.0
Medicare tax (in %) 2.9 2.5
Ave. insurance premium (in % of per capita GDP) 10.9 10.1
Size of Medicaid & Medicare (in % of GDP) 4.6 4.8
Consumption and health expenditure profiles see figure 2
Gross saving rate (in %) 21.0 25.8
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Figure 3: Life cycle profiles of health expenditure and consumption
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Figure 4: Welfare effects of reform A-1
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Figure 5: Welfare effects of reform A-2
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Figure 6: Welfare effects of reform B-1
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Figure 7: Welfare effects of reform B-2
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Figure 8: Welfare effects of reform C
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Figure 9: Welfare effects of reform D-1
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Figure 10: Welfare effects of reform D-2
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